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1 Introduction
This article argues for a fresh approach to agricultural
policy inAfrica, to exploit the strengths ofboth state-
led and market-led development approaches
pursued over the last 50 years, while avoiding their
respective weaknesses and addressing the particular
challenges and opportunities facing agricultural
development in the early twenty-first century.
Following a brief review of agricultural development
policy, we describe the coordination problems in
agricultural development and suggest an inclusive
policy goal of “developmental coordination”.
2 Agricultural policies in Africa
At independence, most developing country
governments were very aware of the importance of
agriculture to their development aspirations. Some
saw it as a long-term driver of growth in their
fledgling economies, others saw it more as a foreign
exchange earner with a large reserve of unutilised
labour, ripe to be taxed to fund the development
of industries on which to build amodern economy.
Either way, rapid increases in agricultural
productivity were needed. The private sector,
however, was generally considered too weak to take
on this role: it lacked organisational capacity, access
to capital and human resources and incentives to
make large, risky and unattractive investments in
rural areas,partly because simultaneous investments
were needed in communications infrastructure,
input and output trading, research and extension,
and in farmers’ input purchases and production.
The private sector was also not trusted by nationalist
leaders with socialist leanings, who associated it
with exploitation by colonial or local Èlites. State
intervention, on the other hand, was considered
an effective and willing instrument for development,
well placed to access public sector finance sources
and to invest in organisational and human resource
development, as well as in infrastructure and in the
coordinated delivery of research, extension, financial
and input and output marketing services.
As a result, the secondhalf of the twentieth century
saw massive government investments in agriculture
around the world.Models of interventionhave varied
widely across region, crop and timeperiod, involving:
(a) price interventions in the formof input and finance
subsidies andproduceprice stabilisation and support
(often within import-export parity pricebands), and
(b) organisational interventions (parastatals, state-
sponsored cooperatives, and agricultural finance
organisations), which went well beyond what was
necessary purely to administer price interventions
(Dorward et al. 2004a).
The results of this state activism were mixed. In
some(mainly Asian countries) they were spectacularly
successful, and wereassociated with themost dramatic
and widespreadprocesses of agricultural growth and
poverty reduction inhistory. Inother (mainly African)
countries, however, large government expenditures
and activity in agricultural development led to very
little agricultural growth and were amajor drain on
government budgets. As a result, donor support
waned andduring the early 1980s there was hostility
towards the whole state-leddevelopment approach.1
Government intervention was then seen as causing
inefficient distortions in the economy (by protecting
inefficient local industries); depressing efficiency by
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limiting local competition and private sector
development; corrupt; anexpensivedrain on already
overspent government budgets, and giving farmers
poor services.
The outcomes of the market liberalisation and
structural adjustment policies that were subsequently
introduced were, however, equally mixed. These
“market-led” policies appear to have successfully
stimulated growth in poor countries with dense
populations, good infrastructure and a diversified
agriculture and rural economy (e.g. Bangladesh).
They also appear to have benefited lower-middle
income countries where staples production is no
longer the basis of the livelihoods of most of the
poor. In most of Africa, however, the record is not
so bright: these policies have not been generally
successful in “getting agriculture moving”.Despite
some benefits – such as reduced food prices for
processed staples for poor consumers in Southern
Africa (see Jayne and Jones 1997) and positive
impacts in the supply chains for some cash crops
in some countries (see Poulton et al. 2004 for a
discussion of cotton) – there has been anotable lack
of success in developing input, output and financial
markets offering attractively priced, timely and
reliable services that are critical for food crop
intensification. The agricultural sector in Least
DevelopedCountries (LDCs) over the last 30 years
shows low rates of growth in the 1980s and 1990s,
and indeed negative rates are recorded for value
added per capita over most of the period (Dorward
and Morrison 2000). LDC performance (with a
preponderance of sub-Sahara African countries)
contrasts withAsianperformance where agricultural
growth advanced ahead of population growth, with
continuing increases in both land and labour
productivity in agriculture. Sub-SaharanAfrica also
increased its area under cereals dramatically at the
expense of other crops, reduced its rate of fertiliser
use, and achievedmore than 70 per cent of its limited
increased cereal production from area (as opposed
to yield) increases (World Bank 2000; FAO 2000).
While few would argue that the pre-liberalisation
situation could or should have been sustained, it
is widely recognised that liberalisation has not
delivered the substantial agricultural growth needed
to drive rural poverty reduction and increased food
security. We therefore have to ask why both state
andmarket led development approaches appear to
have generally failed in Africa, whereas both have
worked in parts of Asia.
3 State, market and coordination
failures
There are threemain explanations for liberalisation
failures:partial liberalisation, weak institutions and
coordination failures.The first two explanations are
broadly supportive of the liberalisation agenda but
critical of its implementation.Themain thrust of the
“partial liberalisation” argument is that partial rather
than complete withdrawal of the state, together with
real or perceived threats of policy reversals and
continuedprice controls and competitive advantages
for parastatals,have depressed returns and increased
risks to private sector investment (Kherallah et al.
2000; Jayne et al. 2002). The “weak institutions”
argument adds a further explanation for slow market
development in terms of weak institutional support
to market and private sector development (World
Bank 2002) with cultural, political and legal factors
undermining clear property rights andhence private
investment incentives.Here the liberalisation agenda
that tried to escape the problem of state failure in
market interventions has run up against different
problems of serious state failure, now in delivering
public goods – the institutions and infrastructure
needed for privatised competitivemarkets tooperate
in the challenging conditions where poverty is most
intractable.
Coordination failure arguments, on the other
hand, are more critical of liberalisation’s
conceptualisation ofmarkets as efficient and effective
exchange mechanisms in poor rural areas. We
emphasise two related arguments here: first that
markets face particular challenges in coordinating
exchange for agricultural development in poor rural
areas, and second, that the liberalisation agenda
has not placed enough emphasis on the importance
of firms and organisations in the development and
operation of market economies.
3.1 Market coordination challenges in
poor rural areas
Poor rural areas face a daunting set of generic and
oftenmutually reinforcing problems, which include:
● poor roads and telecommunications
● poor human health
● lack of a well-developed and diversified
monetary economy
● thinmarkets for agricultural inputs, outputs and
finance, despite significant direct and indirect
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dependence of the economy of these areas on
agriculture
● a (particularly agricultural) business environment
characterised by weak information (on prices,
new technologies, and other potential market
players), difficult and weak contract
enforcement, high risks (in production and
prices, but also in access to inputs andmarkets
and in enforcing contracts) and high transactions
costs.2
● further challenges specific to small-scale farming
include long production and sales cycles
(exacerbating risks); community-wide
seasonality in labour use, cash flow, food
availability, prices and risks; technical progress
and land pressure increasing farmers’ needs for
small-scale, transaction cost-intensive input
purchases, which in turn require seasonal finance
and riskmitigation systems whichpose particular
challenges in subsistence crop production;
technical choices involving discontinuous
switches between technologies and crops across
threshold prices which simultaneously affect
significant numbers of farmers’ demand and
supply of services and/or commodities; and land
tenure arrangements which limit incentives for
land improvement and famers’ ability to borrow,
to expand or to exit agriculture with a lump sum.
Input supply system development poses
particular off-farm challenges. Key inputs such as
fertiliser are purchased by farmers in fairly narrow
time windows, with their uncertain input demands
depending upon assessment of input profitability
(affected by relative input and output prices and
by unfolding climatic and pest behaviour during
the season) and upon their ability to finance
purchases (depending on their individual wealth
and income status, their vulnerability to shocks
affecting incomes and expenditure, their access to
credit, etc.).However, if stockists are left with excess
inventory, then this often cannot be disposed of for
another year and it deteriorates in storage. Stockists
therefore face incentives to be very cautious in
stocking and to cover their risks with highmargins.
The challenges to greater input supply are related
to challenges in delivery of financial services to
farmers to support input purchases – small-scale
lending to dispersed farmers with uncertain credit
demand and engagement in risky enterprises leads
to high transaction costs for lenders and high risks
of default. These must be covered by high interest
rates, whichmake borrowingmore risky for farmers
and hence both depress demand (reducing the scale
of lending) and increase incentives to default –
further increasing the costs of lending (Binswanger
and Rosenzweig 1986).
As problems in input supply and financial service
delivery to small-scale farmers in poor rural areas
are mutually reinforcing, so they can also have
negative effects on output market development.
Without greater use of purchased inputs and
seasonal finance, farmers’ marketed surpluses will
be relatively small, leading to higher transaction
costs and risks for output buyers. Moreover,
surpluses tend to fluctuate considerably from year
to year in response to climatic variations, raising
buyers’ search costs. This requires higher trading
margins and these, with low profits depressing
investment and competition, depress farm gate
prices, further reducing farmers’ demand for inputs
and seasonal finance.
The result of these difficulties facing rural
economic activities is widespread “transaction
failure” which can lead to a “low-level equilibrium
trap” (Dorward et al. 2005), where constraints, lack
of investment incentives and a stagnant rural
economy reinforce each other. Fundamentally,
transaction failures arise because the returns from
these transactions do not justify the costs and risks
involved. Four main classes of cost, each with
associated risks of failure, need to be considered:
1. Costs of production
2. Costs of limiting (and meeting) demands for
“rents” (legitimate and illegitimate taxes, duties
and bribes demanded by government officials,
criminals, etc.)
3. Costs of coordination3 (searching and screening
and investing in relationships with potential
investors in complementary activities in the
supply chain)
4. Costs of limiting opportunism (establishing
mechanisms and relationships for protection
against opportunistic behaviour by monopolistic
or monopsonistic partners in the supply chain)
(Dorward et al. 2004b).
Coordination and opportunism are particularly
problematic causes of transaction failure where
technical change requires significant and enterprise
specific investments at a number of different points
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along a supply chain (e.g. in delivery of seasonal
finance, input and output services to farmers) for
that supply chain to function. The central
coordination challenge facing smallholder
agricultural development is, therefore, how to
develop supply chain systems that provide
smallholders with access to the range of pre-harvest
services that they require at the same time as
enhancing their access to remunerative output
market opportunities. This requires non-market
coordination (sometimes, but not necessarily, led
by the state) to deal with risks that inhibit
complementary and mutually dependent
investments along a supply chain, where these
investments are held back by thin markets and by
high costs in controlling opportunism (e.g. in
produce grading and in seasonal finance).
3.2 The importance of firms in market
economies
Firms of varying sizes play a critical role in advanced
market economies both as major players inmarkets
and as entities within which significant volumes of
non-market transactions occur. In poor rural
economies in Africa there are few large firms but
large numbers of small market participants, with
markets playing a greater allocative role. Fafchamps
(2004) observes that the grain trade in theUSA has
many fewer intermediaries between producer and
consumer than liberalised markets in Africa. The
grain trade in Africa therefore makes more use of
market transactions, with less economic exchange
and coordination within firms. Yet market exchange
in Africa is generally ‘costly, cumbersome, time-
consuming, and unpredictable’ (Fafchamps 2004).
There are a number of explanations for this but for
Fafchamps, the plethora ofmarket participants and
the lack of medium and large firms are critical
sources of weakness.
3.3 Coordination failures and Africa’s
agricultural development performance
The coordination failure arguments presented above
provide a robust explanation of theAsian andAfrican
experiences with state- andmarket-leddevelopment.
Dorward et al. (2004a) argue that state-led
development policies in successfulGreenRevolutions
“kick-startedmarkets” by overcoming coordination
failures, and stimulated activity by large organisations
in poor rural areas wherebasicnecessary conditions
for rapid growth had already been established
(communications and irrigation infrastructure,
productive andpotentially profitable technologies).
Later liberalisation occurred once markets were
sufficiently developed (as regards volumes and the
development of large firms) tohave escaped the low-
level equilibrium trap. InAfrica, on the other hand,
state-led attempts to kick-start markets anddevelop
large organisations largely failed because the prior
conditions had not been established. Subsequent
liberalisation reduced the wastage of resources
consumed by these ineffective policies but, without
prior escape from the low-level equilibrium trap,did
not stimulatemarket development.Liberalisation of
some cash crop markets was successful, however,
because these offered sufficient profits to attract
investments by large firms which can lower marketing
costs and, under particular conditions, also develop
institutional arrangements toovercome coordination
failures (Poulton et al. 2004).
4 Beyond liberalisation
Different explanations for the disappointing
performance of market liberalisation policies in
poor rural areas lead to some common and some
divergent policy prescriptions. “Partial liberalisation”
and “weak institutions” critiques place particular
emphasis on policies aimed at promoting the
development of competitivemarkets in agricultural
supply chains and smallholder farmers’ access to
these markets. These include:
● promoting small agribusiness development
through training, financing, and linkages with
wholesale input suppliers and produce buyers
● supporting farmer organisations
● investments inmarket information systems and
market infrastructure development
● reduction of business establishment costs
● further liberalisation, with transparent
commitment to complete withdrawal of the state
from market interventions.
The first four of these policies are also generally
supported by the “coordination failure” critique of
liberalisation. By contrast, the last policy would be
heavily qualified, with recognition of its
appropriateness in some circumstances and of the
dangers of state interventions, but also of situations
where the disadvantages of competition outweigh
the benefits and/or where non-market coordination
mechanisms are needed.
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Kydd and Dorward (2004) and Dorward et al.
(2004b) use the analysis of production, rent,
coordination and opportunism costs described
earlier to integrate the different analytical and policy
perspectives outlined above. They suggest that
smallholder agricultural development problems
may be addressed by:
● technical, price or institutional changes that
dramatically raise returns to private, commercial
investments in agricultural supply chains by
cutting costs, reducing “rents” and opportunism,
or raising revenues – thereby making it easier
to cross thresholds of coordination failure
● large-scale investments by governments or
donors which may improve returns to private,
commercial investors and, where coordination
failure is a problem, “pump prime” the supply
chain to make it easier for private, commercial
investments to take supply chains across critical
investment thresholds
● explicit development of coordination
mechanisms to reduce transaction costs and
risks of opportunism and coordination.
Coordination mechanisms may be characterised
as endogenous or exogenous, local or extensive, soft
or hard, and vertical or horizontal.Endogenous “local”
coordinationmechanisms may developeither through
vertical integration (effectively larger-scalecommercial
farms) or through local relations linking agents
interested in investing in different activities in the
supply chain, for example through farmer groups or
interlocking arrangements by (generally powerful)
traders. In staplecrops, where total supply chainprofits
are likely tobemore limited thanincashcrops,progress
in local investment is likely tobe slow (as low returns
weaken both the incentives to set up coordinating
institutions and thepenalties for defection).Eventually,
if there is sufficient growth in local coordination
mechanisms thesemay inaggregate reach the threshold
level of total investment in the supply chain, enabling
a transition into amarket-based growth path. Left to
itself this process is, however, likely to be slow and
fragile, highly path-dependent and susceptible to
political economy processes of rent-seeking and to
shocks affecting the total investment threshold.
Alternatives to slow and fragile endogenous local
coordination processes are (a) externally assisted
“soft” coordination processes (e.g. involving state
or NGO support for the development of farmer
organisations, trader associations, or contract
grower, nucleus/outgrower and other interlocking
systems) or (b) more extensive “hard” coordination
where a strong central coordinating body with a
mandate from the state ensures investments across
the supply chain with highly credible coordinated
commitments. This could be implemented in a
variety of ways, but a return to old parastatal models
is unlikely to work in most situations.
We conclude by suggesting a set of broad and
related issues, whichmust be recognised in policy
development and implementation in African
agriculture. Attention needs to be paid to:
● stages of market and economy development
which demand different types of policy and
institutional development (Adelman andMorris
1997; Dorward et al. 2004a)
● diversity of constraints to and needs in
development – between different areas, over
time and between different crops
● political economy considerations which prevent
governments from completely “letting go” of,
for example, staple foodmarkets or which cause
particular interest groups to block change
● the variety of coordination mechanisms which
may need support in different contexts (e.g.
regulated monopolies, franchises, trader and
farmer associations)
● in certain circumstances, price interventions
such as price guarantees, price support or
input/output/credit subsidies may be needed –
but thesemust be approached with great caution
to avoid the mistakes and failures of the past,
with rigorous design and governance;
● managing transitions – for example, from food
deficit to food surplus economies, or from one
formofcoordinationor market structure toanother
● transparency, accountability (to farmers, traders
and consumers), consistency and flexibility in
both policy-making and implementation
● focusing on how things are done as much as on
what is done (Omamo 2003).
Taken together, these issues go beyond what has
become an unhelpful, increasingly artificial and
obsolete, but persistent divide between state- and
market-led development approaches between
“market fundamentalists” and “market sceptics”,
to suggest the need for a common, inclusive,
pragmatic pursuit of “developmental coordination”.
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Notes
1. The Berg report (World Bank 1981), for example,marked
a watershed in the development of the Washington
Consensus on economic policies in Africa.
2. Transaction costs (notoriously difficult to define) are
distinguished from transformation costs, the costs of
making or growing things or physically providing services,
including transport services.We consider here transaction
costs that buyers and sellers incur in protecting themselves
against risks of a transaction failing (due to the absence
of suppliers or buyers) by searching for and screening
potential suppliers or buyers, negotiating and contracting
with them, andmonitoring and enforcing their adherence
to the contract. However transaction costs also involve
costs incurred to protect a contracting counter-party
against transaction failure (to induce them to enter a
contract) and costs incurred inmeeting licensing or other
requirements of bureaucratic and rent-seeking
government agencies and officials.Reducing this last type
of transaction cost is an important focus of market
liberalisation policies, which we discuss later.
3. Coordination is ‘aprocess in whichplayers within a supply
chain are encouraged to take common or complementary
actions necessary to achieve individual goals’ (adapted
from Poulton et al. 2004). Coordination failure is then
defined in terms of its direct effects on individual investors,
as ‘the failure to make an investment due to a possible
absence of complementary investments by other players
at different stages in the supply chain’ (modified from
Dorward and Kydd 2004).
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